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Specific information on trade and financial markets across international borders is 
costly to acquire. Sellers and buyers rely instead on information obtained from 
partner behavior in other countries.  Three channels are identified through which 
information is disseminated in import and equity markets of 14 OECD countries. 
The first consists of information spillovers from commercial to financial markets 
and vice-versa. We find strong evidence in support of the first direction and some 
for the reverse, suggesting that traders use common information, frequently from 
the same sources, such as financial intermediaries.  The second and third channels 
emphasize seller and buyer reputation in third markets.  They are equally 
important in explaining bilateral import flows, but buyer reputation appears to be 
more relevant for equity flows.  All three channels may help better explain 
contagion effects across markets and countries.  
 
JEL classification codes: F10, F30, L15 
Keywords: Trade, Equity flows, Information spillovers  
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  3  41 Introduction 
 
Globalization has been a persistent phenomenon of the post-war period.  The gross volume of 
cross-border capital flows has grown at an average of 25 percent per year, and trade in goods and 
services has also increased, albeit not as dramatically, but at least twice as fast as world GDP, 
over the past 20 years. The most common explanation lies in the dramatic declines in 
communication and transport costs.
1  
On the other hand, a growing literature has argued that this globalization process may not 
be as important as is commonly perceived.  Trade and financial markets still experience an 
impressive “home bias” in the sense that consumers and investors continue to prefer to spend and 
hold a disproportionate share of their assets in local markets. McCallum (1995) finds that trade 
among Canadian provinces is 22 times larger than trade between Canadian provinces and states 
in the United States, in spite of the absence of significant trade barriers between these two 
countries.
2  In the same vein, Trefler (1995) finds that a large share of “missing trade”—the fact 
that one observes a much smaller volume of trade than predicted by a factor abundance model—
can be explained by a bias in preferences towards “home” goods. Similarly, Tesar and Warner 
(1998) observed that more than 90 percent of American and Japanese equity wealth is held at 
home.  For Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), this “home bias” reflects the persistence of  (moderate) 
trade costs as they point out the continuous success of the simple gravity approach in explaining 
trade and investment flows between countries.
3   
More generally, the relative importance of information costs on trade and financial flows 
has been emphasized in several recent studies.
4  Rangan and Lawrance (1999) suggest that firms, 
in pursuing cross-border economic opportunities, engage in a double process of identifying 
potential exchange partners, and of assessing their reliability and creditworthiness. Both search 
                                                           
1 For example, air-shipping prices have fallen by 55 percent since 1980 in the United States (World Bank, 2001). 
Similarly, maritime shipping prices have declined by 45 percent since 1985. The cost of a 3-minute telephone call 
between New York and London went down 99 percent between 1970 and 1997, and the cost of information 
processing by a computer per instruction per second has declined more than 99.99 percent since 1980 (World Bank, 
1998). 
2 An extensive literature has followed to try to explain this high number, and although the latest estimates by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) reduced this number to 6, the figure still exhibits an impressive amount of home 
bias.  
3 There are probably too many trade theories behind the gravity equation (Deardorff, 1998), but as suggested by 
Evenett and Keller (2001), these explain different types of trade patterns across countries. 
4 Grossman (1998) avers “that we need models where distance (and common policy, and common language, and 
common culture) play more of a role. I suspect this is a model with imperfect information, where familiarity 
declines rapidly with distance…” 
  5and deliberation are information-intensive processes that are likely to be more important in 
international than domestic transactions.  Rauch (1999) shows that proximity and common 
language explain more trade in differentiated products than in homogenous products because 
search costs are larger. Evans (2000) establishes that the home bias identified by McCallum 
(1995) for Canada-US trade is more important for differentiated than for homogeneous goods, 
emphasizing the role played by information asymmetries. In a similar vein, Rauch and Trindade 
(1999) explain the variations in China’s bilateral trade by the role of Chinese ethnic networks, 
which reduce information costs. Portes and Rey (1999) find that the importance of distance as a 
determinant of bilateral trade and equity flows is reduced by more than half when information 
flows among countries are accounted for by bilateral phone calls and the number of foreign 
subsidiaries established in the recipient country.  Lastly, Nicita and Olarreaga (2000) find that 
the role of information goes beyond bilateral partners, as importers may also refer to the 
performance of exporters in third markets to determine their worthiness.  
The objective of this paper is to explore three potential channels through which cross-
country information spillovers can influence bilateral trade and equity flows. Although the role 
of information has been emphasized in the recent literature, little attention has been given to the 
channels through which information is diffused across traders and markets. The first channel 
consists of information spillovers between cross-border flows of equity and goods. Since getting 
information about a specific country is costly, once the decision has been made to overcome 
these costs and acquire information, it may be rational to invest in different types of flows 
simultaneously. This can best be illustrated by considering the role of banks or financial 
intermediaries, who will acquire information, and then finance trade, equity, and FDI 
transactions as well as inform their clients about possibilities for investment and trade projects in 
the country. The concentration of financial (e.g., FDI) and commercial flows in a relatively small 
number of large multinationals also suggests information sharing among decision-makers within 
these companies. Foreign affiliates of multinationals account simultaneously for more than one 
fifth of world exports and for an important share of FDI worldwide; the 100 largest 
Transnational Companies accounted for about 12 percent of total foreign assets in 2000 
(UNCTAD, 2001). Thus, the concentration of information in a few agents in international 
markets suggests that equity investors are able to capture basic information from existing 
  6bilateral commercial flows, and vice-versa, leading to a strong link between these two types of 
flows.
5 
The second channel examines to what extent importers and equity investors base their 
purchasing decisions on the performance of the sellers in other countries. We call this the seller-
reputation effect. Importers in the United States who are considering buying products from Italy 
may want to learn from the experience of Canadian or Japanese importers that buy Italian 
products (for example, do Italian exporters deliver on time?). Similarly, when Swiss investors 
consider investing in France they may be influenced by the experience of other foreign investors 
(e.g., German or Japanese) in France.  In addition, Swiss investors and American importers will 
pay more attention to investors and importers who are “closer” to them in an information sense 
(i.e., those with whom they exchange a significant amount of information). 
Finally, the third channel is the buyer-reputation  effect. Exporters may search for 
information on the experience of other country exporters with an importer (for example, does the 
importer pay on time?). Similarly, before selling equity to a foreign investor the seller may seek 
information on the reliability of the foreign buyer by assessing his reputation in other countries. 
For international traders, access to the judiciary system may be very costly and the understanding 
of the legal system more difficult, suggesting that the buyer and seller reputation potentially 
plays a larger role for international than for national transactions.  
We explore the potential role of these information channels as determinants of cross-
border flows in a panel of 14 countries (and 182 bilateral relationships for each cross-border 
flow) over a period of 7 years. After correcting for different endogeneity biases, and observing a 
strong autocorrelation of the error term, we develop a simple, new methodology to estimate a 
gravity model with panel data in the presence of serial correlation in the error term. The results 
suggest, first, that bilateral imports are an important determinant of bilateral equity outflows, but 
the reverse is less true, suggesting that investors partially base their actions on observed trade 
flows, whereas importers do not seem to rely as much on information provided by investors 
abroad. This finding may also indicate that information that leads to decisions regarding 
purchases of goods may also lead to decisions regarding ownership of firms that produce those 
                                                           
5 More generally, the empirical interdependence between the current and capital accounts as well as the different 
elements of the capital accounts has been well demonstrated by several authors (see Claessens and Dooley, 1995, or 
Edwards, 1998).  
 
  7goods. Second, there is strong evidence of buyer- and seller-reputation effects in international 
goods markets. Third, in equity markets there is strong evidence of buyer-reputation effects, 
whereas there is little evidence of seller-reputation effects.  
Although some information channels seem more important than others, the information-
content of cross-border flows appears to be an important determinant of bilateral imports and 
equity outflows. We believe that this finding provides some insights into recent episodes of 
contagion in financial and commercial markets across countries over the past few years (see 
Carmazza, Ricci, and Salgado, 2000 and Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).  Information flows 
not only from one country to another through seller and buyer reputation channels, but also 
across commercial and equity markets when investors are using the same sources of information. 
All these channels may represent avenues for contagion.  These results are compatible with 
explanations where contagion is more likely when investors cannot distinguish between different 
types of shocks (say, quality and productivity shocks),
6 or in environments where there are fixed 
costs in gathering country-specific information (as in Calvo and Mendoza, 2000).  It is clear that 
information diffusion across markets can create virtuous or vicious circles.  In this paper we 
identify channels through which information flows across countries and markets. 
   The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model to 
explain the role of the information content of rest-of-the world cross-border flows in determining 
bilateral trade flows. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology, and Section 4 presents the 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 A  Simple  Model 
 
The model developed here is a simple extension of the probability model proposed by Leamer 
and Stern (1970), where cross-border flows are viewed as being generated by a large number of 
independent transactions. World trade and equity flows are respectively defined as 
where  are total imports of country i and e are total equity 
outflows of country i. Shares of country i in total world trade and equity flows are then defined 
as 
,   and    ∑ ∑ = =
i i i i e E m M i m i
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6 See Calvo (1999) for an example with a similar argument for bond flows.   
  8  The probability that buyers and sellers of products and equities across international 
borders agree on a particular transaction will depend on transaction costs among countries. 
Transaction costs are a function of geographic distance among countries, language, cultural 
differences and, more importantly, the extent to which information flows among countries. 
Information on potential buyers’ and sellers’ reliability will tend to reduce transaction costs. This 
information could be obtained from other countries. For example, transaction costs between 
buyers in country i and sellers in country j will depend on the extent that information on j’s seller 
performance with other countries is provided to buyers in country i, and vice versa.  
Another source of reduction in transaction costs, between an importer in i and an exporter 
in j, is the information revealed by existing cross-border equity flows between i and j. Similarly, 
the existence of trade flows between i and j may reveal information for cross-border investors in 
i and j. These information flows could even be internal to the firm, as argued earlier.  
  Summarizing all the determinants of transaction costs described above, the transaction 
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C ; where  is the 
distance between countries i and j;  is the bilateral information flow between countries i and 
j;  is the information that country i obtains from other countries (k) on the performance of j; 
is the information that country j obtains from other countries (k) on the performance of i; 
and  is the other flow (equity or trade) between i and j.  The three last variables capture the 
three channels described in the introduction: seller reputation, Ω , buyer reputation,  , 
and information spillovers between equity and import flows,  . 
















Assuming that the matching of buyers and sellers is independently drawn from the pool 
of potential cross-border flows in the world, and that the probability of their agreeing on a 
particular transaction, π , depends on the extent of transaction costs, then the probability that one 
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The expected value of country i purchasing equity or goods (imports) from country j is 
then given by: 
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Assuming that transaction costs functions are log-linear and that total flows from a 
particular country depend log-linearly on the size (GDP) and level of development (GDP per 
capita, noted  l y ) of the country, the expressions in equation (2) can be rewritten as 
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We will base the empirical analysis on a stochastic version of the expressions in equation 
(3). All parameters are expected to be positive except for  4 3 4 3 , , , λ λ β β , which capture the 
impact of GDP per capita (through population) on import and equity flows, and  5 5   and   λ β , which 
capture the impact of geographic distance on the transaction cost between two trading partners. 
Parameters with subscripts 7 to 10 capture the information content of cross-border flows. 
Common language, which is also a determinant of transaction costs, will be introduced as a 
dummy variable in both equations. 
 
3 Empirical  Strategy 
 
We apply the model to a sample of 14 developed countries from 1990 to 1996.
7  Although this 
sample may appear limited at first glance, it is useful to recall that, in 1996, these 14 countries 
represented more than 86 percent of global equity capitalization, about 97 percent of equity 
                                                           
7 These are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Scandinavia (Sweden, 
Norway, Finland), Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.   
  10flows, 74 percent of world GDP, and 65 percent of world trade.
8  The absence of developing 
countries is explained by the non-availability of data on bilateral equity flows.
9 
As in Portes and Rey (1999), data on bilateral equity flows was obtained from Cross-
Border Capital. Bilateral equity outflows ( ) are measured as equity purchases of residents of 
country i in the equity markets of country j.
j i e ,
10 Bilateral imports ( ) only include trade in goods 
(from United Nations’ Comtrade database) because figures on bilateral service trade are not as 
accurate. GDP ( ) and population ( ) data are from the World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank.  Bilateral distance ( ) was calculated as the geographic distance between 
capitals.  
j i m ,
y l
i d , j
To proxy for bilateral information flows ( j i, Ω ) across countries, we followed Portes and 
Rey (1999) and used the volume of telephone call traffic from country i to country j provided by 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). We also used an alternative proxy defined as 
the bilateral trade in newspapers and periodicals
11 because data on bilateral phone calls by ITU 
has several missing values for our sample of countries. Moreover, by using the newspaper data, 
we are able to distinguish between imports and exports of newspapers and so identify the 
direction of the information flow. Such a distinction was not possible with the data on bilateral 
phone calls, given that it is difficult a priori to know in which direction the information flows in 
a telephone conversation.
12  These two proxies are, however, highly correlated, as shown in 
Figure 1 (the correlation coefficient is 0.77 and significant at the 1 percent level).
13  
Next, we measure the two information channels that have been emphasized in this paper: 
seller and buyer reputation, for both imports and equities, as follows (for  ):  m e f , =
                                                           
8 Sources are Tesar (1998) for capitalization figures, World Development Indicators for trade and GDP figures, and 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics for equity flows. 
9 We also attempted to introduce Foreign Direct Investment outflows in our model, but the results of the FDI 
equation were very poor, probably due to the quality of the data (the OECD International Foreign Direct Investment 
statistics only report “net” outflows). Also, the usual criteria (i.e., more than 10 percent equity investment to be 
classified as FDI) is not clear-cut, and both flows are frequently confused, especially in the cases of mergers or 
privatization (see Graham and Krugman, 1995, for a few examples).  
10 Unlike Portes and Rey (1999), we only include purchases and exclude sales to capture gross rather than “net” 
equity outflows. 
11 See Nicita and Olarreaga (2000). 
12 Note that the data has information on who called, but this may be completely orthogonal to the direction of the 
information flow. 
13 In the late 1990s a better proxy for bilateral information flows could be Internet traffic. However, information on 
bilateral Internet traffic is not available to our knowledge. Given that our sample ends in 1996, newspaper and 
phone-call traffic seem relatively good proxies. 
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where  is the total volume of international phone calls of country j.  Alternatively, when we 






The first two equations capture the seller and buyer reputation channels for imports, 
while the last two do so for equities.  It might be useful to recall the assumptions behind the 
construction of these information variables.  The seller reputation channel captures the idea, for 
example, that a German importer assesses the reputation of a US exporting firm by accounting 
for the willingness of other buyers to purchase the US firm’s exports.  Furthermore, he 
incorporates the behavior of other investors into his own decision proportionally to the flow of 
information that he will receive from them.  Specifically, in the case of country i imports from 
country j, the seller-reputation channel   is defined as the weighted-sum of all country k 
imports from country j weighted by the share of information exchanged between country i and 




→ Ω  
14 The buyer-reputation channel   is 
defined in the same manner. In the case of imports, it is equal to the information-weighted sum 
of imports that country i buys from all k  countries, weighted by the share of information 
exchanged between exporter j and all k countries which export to country i. The same definition 
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We faced a series of problems in estimating equations (3).  A priori, one could use 
ordinary least squares (OLS), pooling the whole data set and introducing year dummies to 
capture the size of world trade and equity flows ( ) and all other missing variables that  E M   and  
                                                           
14 When phone calls are used as the information variable, the information flow is defined as the sum of phone calls 
from country i to country k and from country k to country i.  This flow is divided by the sum of total bilateral phone 
calls between country i and other countries to determine the information share. When newspaper exports are used as 
the information weights, they are defined as exports of newspapers from k to i divided by total imports of 
newspapers by country i.     
  12are year-specific and invariant across countries. A first set of regressions along these lines is 
presented in the next section.   
However, there are several simultaneity problems that need to be dealt with when 
estimating equations (3). The first problem is that equity flows and imports are by assumption 
endogenous to each other and therefore need to be estimated simultaneously in order to obtain 
unbiased estimates. We accounted for this problem by estimating both equations simultaneously 
and using as instruments market capitalization in each country, and import and export taxes.
15 
The second problem is that our information variables described in equations (4) (the buyer- and 
seller-reputation variables) are constructed using trade and equity flows between countries, thus 
introducing simultaneity by construction. It is straightforward to see that these four variables are 
correlated with the error term. In order to correct for this we used the information variables as 
described in (4), only that they were instrumented by the information-weighted sum of all other 
exogenous variables in (3) (see Anselin, 2001).
16  The last simultaneity issue to tackle is that 
information flows may themselves be endogenous. Indeed, an increase in trade or cross-border 
equity flows may not only be caused by better information, but may also cause higher demand 
for information. We used telephone infrastructure (number of fixed lines) and number of 
newspapers in circulation in each country as instruments for bilateral phone calls and exports of 
newspapers to account for this issue in our system regressions. 
An additional econometric issue we faced is the influence of cyclical factors (e.g., world 
recession or terms of trade changes) on some of our variables. Such an influence could 
significantly bias the estimated coefficients associated with our information variables if omitted. 
In order to control for this, we first introduced time dummies and OECD average growth rates in 
the pooled regression, as suggested by Portes and Rey (1999).
17  We found out that this method 
was not satisfactory because it did not control for serial autocorrelation inherent to import and 
equity flows (as shown by the extremely low Durbin-Watson statistics presented in the next 
section). Given these residual characteristics, we opted for an alternative approach that uses a 
                                                           
15 One could think that the information variables would be sufficient to identify the system of simultaneous 
equations, but as discussed below all information variables are potentially endogenous. 
16 That is, we construct information weighted sums of GDP, population, etc., to instrument seller and buyer 
reputation variables, using weights for each explanatory variable which are identical to those used in the 
construction of seller and buyer reputation variables. Both phone calls and newspaper exports used to construct 
weights are those already instrumented by existing phone lines or total newspaper sales, respectively.  
  13generalized least squares technique to account for serial correlation.  Modifying the typical 
approach that stacks data by country members, we stacked data by years so that the estimated 
residual covariance matrix captures the correlation of error terms across years. By doing so, we 
obtained a system composed of 14 equations: seven for equity purchases and seven for imports 
(one for each of the seven years in the sample). We then constrained the coefficients of each of 
the seven regressions corresponding to each type of flow to be the same for each year (except for 
yearly constants, which capture the effects of cyclical variables). More formally, we exploited 
the asymptotic in the cross-section domain to obtain estimates of serial dependence, and 
therefore correct for autocorrelation of the error term.   
Finally, given the endogeneity between import and equity flows discussed above, the 
estimator we used for this constrained system of 14 equations is three stages least squares 
(3SLS), which allows us to estimate the 14 equations simultaneously while imposing necessary 
constraints on estimates. 
 
4   Results 
 
We present the estimated results for equation (3) using the standard OLS and the 3SLS 
approaches that were described in the preceding section.  The results obtained with OLS (Table 
1) are useful because they can be compared with previous empirical studies that have included 
some of our information variables.  They basically indicate that our results are consistent with 
previous gravity-type estimates and that all our information variables matter on the magnitude of 
bilateral commercial and financial flows. Perhaps most interestingly, the estimated elasticities of 
distance decline significantly once the information variables are introduced. This suggests that an 
important share of what was previously captured by the distance coefficient is better proxied by 
information-related variables.
18  Also note that the number of observations varies in each 
equation because we do not have data on bilateral information flows for all observations (as 
discussed earlier, data on exports of newspapers are more complete than data on bilateral phone 
calls). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 Following Portes and Rey (1999), we also included regional dummies for European countries, East Asian 
countries, and Western Hemisphere countries.  As in many other gravity-type estimations, we also included a 
common language dummy.  For simplicity, these are not included in the functional forms presented here. 
18 See Grossman (1998) and Portes and Rey (1999) for a discussion along these lines. 
  14As explained earlier, these results are nonetheless biased by endogeinity issues and by the 
influence of residual autocorrelation (note the extremely low Durbin-Watson estimates 
suggesting positive autocorrelation of the error term).
19  For this reason, we focus our attention 
on interpreting the findings obtained by using 3SLS (Table 2) that uses the asymptotic in the 
cross-section domain to estimate the time dependence of the error term. 
Given that a priori we did not have a particular preference for the use of phone calls or 
newspaper exports in constructing information variables, we estimated the system with these two 
information variables alternately. The most interesting result consists of the significant role 
played by information variables in bilateral flows of imports of goods and equity purchases, 
showing that buyer and seller reputation channels have an influence on top of standard gravity 
measures such as distance and standard bilateral information flows (such as bilateral phone 
calls), even after controlling for all the sources of bias that were present in the OLS specification. 
Both seller and buyer reputation are significant in explaining bilateral import behavior at 
the one percent level when using newspapers, and at the five percent level when using phone 
calls. By contrast, buyer reputation seems to be the only significant information channel in 
explaining bilateral equity outflows.  This channel may not only capture reputation effects, such 
as the fact that when firms place their equity they need to be careful in selecting their partners, 
but also that some markets may be more liquid than others.  To the extent that there is no perfect 
arbitrage across markets, equity issuers from one country may learn from other equity issuers 
that a particular market or country may be particularly attractive in terms of liquidity to place 
equity. Also, the fact that the seller-reputation effect is insignificant in the case of equity flows 
does not imply that seller reputation is not important. Rather, it suggests that this information is 
not obtained through other buyers. One reason for this is that in the case of firms quoted in stock 
markets, most of the information needed is simply obtained by observing the firm’s valuation in 
the stock market.  
The specification that uses phone calls as the main information variable has the problem 
that the sign of phone calls is negative for imports equations (although it has the correct sign in 
equity equations).  We also included the newspaper variable to see whether it had any additional 
explanatory power on top of that provided by phone calls, and it is only significant for imports 
                                                           
19 The Durbin-Watson estimates have been calculated using the Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982) 
extension to panel data. 
  15equations (and negative but not significant in the equity equations).  By contrast, the 
specification that uses newspapers as the main information variable has the right sign for 
bilateral newspaper exports in both import and equity equations, whereas phone calls seem to 
have no additional explanatory power in either type of equation.  The more parsimonious results 
observed in the system that uses newspapers as the main information variable can be explained 
by the fact that data on bilateral phone calls has several missing values for our sample of 
countries, as well as the fact that by using the newspaper proxies, we can distinguish between 
imports and exports of newspapers and so identify the direction of the information flow, 
something that cannot be done with the data on bilateral phone calls.  Thus, we keep the system 
that uses the newspaper information variable as our preferred specification. 
For our preferred specification, spillover effects are relevant from imports into equity, but 
not vice-versa.  This is shown by the fact that bilateral imports are significant in bilateral equity 
purchases equations at the one percent level, whereas equity purchases are not significant in 
import equations.  This provides evidence that the fact that countries trade between themselves 
opens up opportunities for other types of transactions/investments. Adjusted R
2 measures range 
between 0.68 and 0.72 for imports and 0.54-0.70 for equity, depending on the year. 
For completeness, we also explored estimation of the system using newspapers as the 
main information variable for imports and phone calls for equity, as well as a fourth 
specification, where we use phone calls as the relevant information variable for imports, and 
newspapers for equity.  The results are presented in Table 2a. The specification using phone calls 
for equity and newspapers for imports merits attention, particularly because of the strong impact 
of the phone information variable on equity. Keeping in mind that newspaper exports and 
bilateral phone calls are only proxies for bilateral information flows, one may argue that the type 
of information that is diffused through bilateral phone calls has different properties than 
information diffused through newspapers. In particular, one would expect bilateral phone calls to 
be a better proxy for private information, whereas newspapers may be a better proxy for public 
information. If one believes that international equity flows are more private-information 
intensive,
20 then a specification that proxies the relevant information flows for equity using 
phone calls and for imports using newspaper exports may be the adequate one. Cross-spillover 
                                                           
20 One needs only to briefly visit a trading room to notice the importance of phone calls in the decision of equity 
investors. 
  16effects are significant at the one percent level in both imports and equity equations.  Buyer 
reputation remains robust to this alternative specification both for imports and equity equations, 
but not seller reputation in the case of imports that becomes insignificant. The same is true when 
the sources of information are reversed in the import and equity equations (see the last two 
columns in Table 2). 
   Our estimated equations contain a few additional variables—beyond our three channels—
that may capture the influence of information on bilateral imports and equities.  The role played 
by bilateral distance in imports varies across different specifications, but it is not significant in all 
specifications.  Yet it makes sense that it remains significant given that it plays an important role 
in capturing transport costs.  Distance also remains significant in most equity specifications, but 
its contribution to the explanation of equity flows is smaller than in the standard gravity model 
that excludes information variables.   The use of a common language between any two countries 
also significantly enhances bilateral flows.  This result is consistent with previous empirical 
findings (see Melitz, 2002 for recent evidence). Note, however, that the size of the coefficient in 
front of “common language” declines significantly when we introduce the information variables, 
as was the case with distance (see Table 1). Total bilateral trade of newspapers and/or phone 
calls also contributes to the explanation of both imports and equities flows, although the analysis 
above reveals that phone calls may be more important for equity flows.  
  Other results merit a brief explanation.  Almost all the other estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 99 percent level, with the exception of a few variables.
21  A s  
expected, market capitalization and trade policies (import and export taxes) are robust 
determinants of equity and import flows respectively.  
 
5 Concluding  Remarks 
 
This paper confirms that information matters for investors and traders in international markets.  
Because collecting information is costly, most agents may follow what others are doing or tend 
to focus on what they know best, explaining the home bias observed in the recent literature on 
trade and international finance.  Even though the role of information has been well established, 
                                                           
21 The population variables do not appear significant in the equity equation perhaps because our sample includes 
only highly developed countries (the population coefficient is supposed to capture the level of development, as in 
principle it controls for GDP per capita).  GDP coefficients appear in equity equations with a negative sign.  We 
attribute this to the fact that GDP and market capitalization may be collinear.   
  17there have been surprisingly few attempts to identify the channels through which it is diffused 
across markets and agents. 
We identified three basic channels.  The first channel consists of information spillovers 
between imports and equity markets.  Financial investors and importers seem to react to the same 
set of information, which is frequently conveyed to them by the same source: banks or financial 
intermediaries.  Information on the profitability of conducting trade in goods with a partner may 
also reveal information about the profitability of other types of investment, such as equity.  For 
example, an increase in imports by Switzerland from Canada is likely to positively influence 
cross-border purchases of Canadian equity by Swiss investors.  The second and third channels 
emphasize seller and buyer reputation in international markets.  We provide empirical evidence 
that these two last channels matter for bilateral import flows, while only buyer reputation plays a 
significant role in equity markets.  Both seller and buyer reputation are strongly influenced by 
the level of information that investors or importers receive from international markets.  The 
higher the level of information (as measured by telephone calls or newspapers), the greater will 
be the impact of reputation channels on bilateral flows.  
The above results provide some insights about recent episodes of contagion in financial 
and commercial markets across countries.  Let us take as a starting point a US firm that is 
believed to suffer from an abrupt decline in the quality of its products, leading German importers 
to cut their purchases.  Importers in other countries interpret this decline in German imports as a 
source of bad news about the US firm—our seller reputation channel.  The higher the flows of 
information received by other importers, the greater will be their reduction in imports.  For 
example, Swiss importers would be more influenced than, say, Australian importers, because 
their information linkages with Germany are higher (language, newspapers, phone calls).   
Furthermore, this decline in bilateral imports between the US and Germany, if large enough, 
would send a negative message to German financial investors, who will in turn reduce their 
equity investments (our first channel).  This interconnection between import and equity bilateral 
flows is enhanced by the role of banks and financial intermediaries, who are likely to provide not 
only information but also financing to most investors and importers in their international 
operations.  As noted in the introduction, these results are compatible with explanations along the 
lines of Calvo and Mendoza (2000), who argue that contagion is more likely in environments 
where there are fixed costs in gathering country-specific information, particularly when the 
  18utility gain of paying fixed information costs falls as the number of countries where investments 
can be made increases.  For our specific example, it may be too costly to pay the cost of 
verifying whether the US firm suffered a breach in the quality of its products or not, particularly 
when there are many other partners to trade with. 
Also, to the extent that there is more than one source of uncertainty, there is another 
avenue for contagion.  If investors cannot distinguish between a quality shock, which is clearly 
related to reputation, and, say, a productivity shock, which does not reduce product quality but 
does reduce produced quantity, then productivity shocks may be interpreted as quality shocks 
and lead to lower imports from other countries, even when product quality remains unaffected.
22 
These examples show that information channels across markets can create virtuous or vicious 
circles, explaining contagion effects that took place across several episodes in international 
markets over the past decade. 
Finally, since buyer and seller reputation do influence the behavior of several investors 
and traders across markets, our approach raises the question of the role of government 
intervention in the diffusion of information. There might be a rationale for promotion agencies—
export and investment—in diffusing information and marketing trade and investment 
opportunities. The success of a few agencies such as Ireland’s Industrial Development Agency 
and Singapore’s Economic Development Board seem to support this argument. Still, little is 
known about these agencies, suggesting that more evidence needs to be collected both in 
industrial and developing countries.  
                                                           
22 An example along these lines on informational problems for bond flows (the inability to distinguish between 
shocks to asset returns and liquidity constraints when bond prices fall) can be found in Calvo (1999).  The effects of 
informational frictions combined with margin requirements, and their impact on asset price and trading overreaction 
are covered by Mendoza and Smith (2002).  
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Table 1., continued           
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 using newspaper exports 




Imports ( ) j i m ,  
 
      0.63 
(0.10)*** 
  0.57 
(0.08)*** 
Equity  ( ) j i e ,  
 
    0.07 
(0.01)*** 




2-adjusted  0.76  0.46  0.83 0.62 0.82 0.64 
# of observations  1274  1274  1028 1028 1236 1236 
Durbin-Watson  0.07  0.73  0.08 1.15 0.18 1.14 
* All regressions include time dummies for 1991 to 1996 (1990 is excluded as time 
dummies are correlated with OECD growth). Figures in parenthesis are White-
consistent standard errors (*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level). All variables are taken in logs 
except for OECD growth and the time and regional dummies. The Durbin-Watson 
is estimated using the Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982) formula for 
panel data using the 182 bilateral relationships as the cross-section dimension. 
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Imports ( ) j , i m     1.99 
(0.15)*** 
  0.07 
(0.01)*** 
Equity ( ) j , i e   0.15 
(0.01)*** 




2-adjusted  0.73-0.77  0.41-0.55 0.68-0.72 0.54-0.70 
# of observations  2056  2056 2056 2056 
* Figures in parenthesis are standard errors (*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level and * at the 10 percent level). The first two columns and the last two columns are estimated simultaneously. 
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 using bilateral phone calls 





Trade in newspapers  ( ) j i, Ω   0.22 
(0.05)*** 
    0.07 
(0.18) 
Seller-reputation 










 using newspaper exports 
0.01 
(0.01) 
    0.10 
(0.09) 











 using newspaper exports 
0.23 
(0.07)*** 
    0.71 
(0.07)*** 
Imports ( ) j , i m     1.47 
(0.17)*** 
  1.14 
(0.16)*** 
Equity ( ) j , i e   0.07 
(0.01)*** 




2-adjusted  0.79-0.80  0.50-0.64 0.68-0.78 0.57-0.69 
# of observations  2302  2302 2302 2302 
* Figures in parenthesis are standard errors (*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 
percent level). The first two columns and the last two columns are estimated simultaneously. 
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